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Abstract In the tradition of modal semantics stemming from the work of Kratzer
(1981, 1991), several attempts have been made to analyze adjectives like important,
which are both modal and gradable. I show that existing theories of such gradable
modal adjectives (GMAs) in this framework do not allow for comparisons across
distinct sets or prioritizations of premises, as the basis for comparison in these
theories is too closely wedded to the particular choice and ranking of priorities. To fix
this, I include modal degrees in the ontology, with sets of premises being relativized
to those degrees. What results is a theory that allows comparison across sets of
priorities, while still retaining the premise-based world ordering and quantification
that lies at the heart of Kratzer’s approach. This theory is then extended to account
for existentially-quantifying GMAs like permissible, as well as entailment relations
between modal auxiliaries and GMAs.
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1 Introduction
The adjective important lies at the intersection of two productive research programs
in semantics: gradability and modality. That important is gradable can be seen in
(1): (1a) shows that it is compatible with a variety of degree modifiers, and (1b) that
it can appear in comparative constructions. The modal interpretation of important is
established in (2), which illustrates that, given a fixed context, must p non-mutually
entails it is important that p, which in turn non-mutually entails should p. Hence,
(2a,c) are acceptable, while (2b,d) are judged to be contradictory.
(1) a. It’s somewhat/very/extremely important that you do the dishes.
b. It’s more important that you do the dishes than it is that you walk the dog.
(2) a. It’s important that you do the dishes, but it’s not the case that you must.
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b. # You must do the dishes, but it’s not important that you do so.
c. You should do the dishes, but it’s not important that you do so.
d. # It’s important that you do the dishes, but it’s not the case that you should.
Theories of such gradable modal adjectives (GMAs) have generally fallen into
three categories. Kratzer (1991, 2012), Villalta (2008), Katz, Portner & Rubinstein
(2012), and Portner & Rubinstein (2014) adopt what I will call conservative theo-
ries of gradable modality, in which all modality—gradable or otherwise—involves
premise-based world ordering and quantification along the lines of Kratzer 1981. In
contrast, Lassiter (2011a, 2011b) proposes what might be called a liberal theory:
while he agrees that modal auxiliaries and GMAs have the same underlying seman-
tics, he eschews Kratzer’s approach in favor of probabilities for epistemic modals
and the decision-theoretic notion of expected utility for root modals. Finally, Klecha
(2014) offers a non-unified theory, in which auxiliaries utilize world ordering and
quantification, while GMAs do not, with entailment relations between auxiliaries
and GMAs being captured by meaning postulates.
Restricting my investigation to conservative theories in this paper, I show that
previous approaches cannot account for cases in which comparisons are made across
distinct sets or rankings of priorities, as the proposed means of comparison is too
closely wedded to the particular choice of premises. I resolve this issue by treating
modal degrees as ontological primitives: both the set of modal degrees and their
ordering exist independently of the choice of priorities. This inclusion of degrees
in the ontology is by no means novel, and is a common assumption throughout
the literature on gradability (see von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, Beck 2011 for
extensive discussion). These degrees are then integrated into a Kratzer-style modal
semantics. The analysis is subsequently extended to existentially-quantifying GMAs
like permissible, and then further revised in order to capture the entailments in (2).
The result is a theory that directly incorporates insights from work on the semantics
of gradability, while nonetheless remaining fundamentally true to Kratzer’s theory
of modality.
2 Other conservative theories and their discontents
In this section, I discuss previous conservative theories of gradable modality, and the
problems they face when comparing across different sets and rankings of priorities.
I focus mostly on a somewhat simplified version of the theory adopted by Portner &
Rubinstein (2014), as it is both the easiest theory in which to formulate the problem
and the theory most similar to the one set forth in Section 3. Other conservative
theories will receive a brief mention at the end of this section, where we will see that
they fare no better.
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2.1 Formal underpinnings
As discussed above, conservative theories take as their starting point Kratzer’s (1981,
1991) seminal theory of modality. Kratzer makes use of two context-dependent
functions from worlds to sets of propositions: the modal base ( f ) restricts the set
of worlds under consideration, while the ordering source (g) induces a preorder of
worlds with respect to a contextually determined set of priorities.
Given a world of evaluation w and context c, the way that f c(w) restricts the set
of worlds is simple: only worlds in which all the propositions in f c(w) hold will be
under consideration. Since a proposition is treated as (the characteristic function of)
a set of possible worlds, this means that the set of viable worlds is
⋂
f c(w), which I
will refer to as Fcw. As for the world-ordering generated by g
c(w), Kratzer follows
Lewis (1981) in adopting the definition of 4A in (3), where A is a set of propositions,
and w1 4A w2 means that w1 is at least as ideal as w2 with respect to 4A:
(3) w1 4A w2 iff {p ∈ A | p(w1)} ⊇ {p ∈ A | p(w2)}
For Kratzer, modal auxiliaries then quantify over the set of 4gc(w)-ideal worlds
in Fcw, with must p asserting that p holds in all ideal worlds, and can p asserting that
p holds in at least one ideal world:1
(4) If BEST(4gc(w),Fcw) = {w′ ∈ Fcw | ¬∃w′′ ∈ Fcw[w′′ ≺gc(w) w′]}, then
a. Jmust pKc = λw. ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4gc(w),Fcw)[p(w′)]
b. Jcan pKc = λw. ∃w′ ∈ BEST(4gc(w),Fcw)[p(w′)]
The definitions in (4) are, of course, categorical: in a given context, must p and
can p are either true or false. But as (1) illustrates, there are scalar, non-categorical
varieties of modality as well. The challenge facing conservative theories, then, is
how to capture these gradable modal interpertations within Kratzer’s framework.
2.2 Portner & Rubinstein’s theory
Portner & Rubinstein (2014), hereafter P&R, start with three intuitively plausible
assumptions. First, GMAs like important quantify over worlds in the same manner
as necessity modals. Second, priorities are ranked, with some premises taking higher
priority than others. Third, the relative importance of two propositions correlates
with the relative rank of the premises that necessitate them: if a high-ranking priority
dictates that p, while it takes the addition of lower-ranked priorities to make q
mandatory, then p is more important than q.
1 This presupposes what Lewis (1973) calls the limit assumption: that there is always a non-empty set
of maximally ideal worlds. Kratzer (1981) avoids this assumption, but I adopt it for simplicity’s sake.
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P&R introduce ranked prioritization by adding a contextually determined func-
tion, which I will call γ , that applies to gc(w) (where w is the world of evaluation),
simulating the gradual removal of lower-priority propositions by generating a set of
subsets of gc(w) representing the stages in this stepwise elimination of premises.2
For instance, imagine that Mary is a secret agent for the CIA, and her team has been
tasked with a rescue mission to take place on Saturday. There are three hostages
to be rescued, with propositions p, q, and r being true in worlds where Pauline,
Quinn, and Rhonda, respectively, are rescued on Saturday. The CIA has decided
that rescuing Pauline is top priority, followed by Quinn, then Rhonda. In this case,
gc(w) = {p,q,r}, while γc(gc(w)) contains {p,q,r}, {p,q}, and {p}, which I will
call A, B, and C, respectively. Notice that since rescuing Rhonda is lowest-priority, r
is removed first, followed by q, with p being highest-priority.
Each of the sets of propositions in γc(gc(w)) can be used to generate its own
world-ordering as in (3). Using the world-orderings 4A, 4B, and 4C, P&R con-
struct a scale—an ordered pair consisting of a set of degrees and an ordering
of those degrees—as follows. First, for each world-ordering, generate the set
of propositions that hold in all ideal worlds in Fcw with respect to that ordering:
{s | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4A,Fcw)[s(w′)]}, {s | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4B,Fcw)[s(w′)]}, and {s | ∀w′ ∈
BEST(4C,Fcw)[s(w′)]}. For this example, I will adopt the simplifying assumption
that p, q, r, and Fcw are all logically independent, i.e., that Mary’s team is capable of
rescuing any combination of the three hostages. This allows for a simplification of
the descriptions of these three sets to {s | p∩q∩ r∩Fcw ⊆ s}, {s | p∩q∩Fcw ⊆ s},
and {s | p∩Fcw ⊆ s}. These sets of propositions are the degrees: call them dA, dB,
and dC, with Dα = {dA,dB,dC}. These degrees are then ordered by the superset
relation: dA ⊃ dB ⊃ dC, so dA <α dB <α dC.
With the modal scale 〈Dα ,≤α〉 now constructed, the denotation of a GMA like
important utilizes a measure function taking a proposition and world of evaluation
as input, and returning a degree. More specifically, since modal degrees are sets
of propositions, the degree returned is the highest degree of which that proposition
is a member. In this example, any proposition p′ entailed by p∩Fcw will have an
importance of dC because p′ ∈ dC. Put in terms of the CIA example, if p′ must be
true in order for Mary’s team to rescue Pauline, then p′ is important to degree dC.
For some proposition q′ entailed by q∩Fcw and not by p∩Fcw (i.e., q′ is necessary
only with regards to saving Quinn), the importance of q′ will be dB, as q′ ∈ dB and
q′ 6∈ dC. Since dB <α dC, q′ is less important than p′. Hence, this theory meets the
three intuitions discussed previously: important involves universal quantification
2 P&R actually follow von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) in adopting an analysis with multiple, ranked
ordering sources, in order to capture distinctions between strong necessity modals like must and weak
necessity modals like should. I will return to this idea later on, but it is worth noting that including it
here would not resolve the problems faced by P&R’s theory.
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over ideal worlds in the construction of degrees (but see Section 3.4), priorities are
ranked by γ , and the importance of a proposition is contingent on how high the
priorities are that demand it.
2.3 Comparison across ordering sources and prioritizations
As we have seen, for P&R, modal scales are directly derived from prioritized sets of
premises. As a result, shifting the priorities around means altering the scale itself.
For example, let’s keep our priorities as {p,q,r}, but switch the rankings of p and r,
so that γ , when applied to this set, returns {{p,q,r},{q,r},{r}}. Retaining previous
assumptions, this means that the set Dβ of degrees will contain {s | p∩q∩ r∩Fcw ⊆
s}, {s | q∩ r∩Fcw ⊆ s}, and {s | r∩Fcw ⊆ s}. The first degree is simply dA again;
the second two I will call d′B and d′C, respectively. This new prioritization has thus
led to the construction of a new scale, 〈Dβ ,≤β 〉, where dA <β d′B <β d′C (since
dA ⊃ d′B ⊃ d′C).
Given these two prioritizations, the importance of rescuing Quinn will be dB
for the scale 〈Dα ,≤α〉, and d′B for the scale 〈Dβ ,≤β 〉. But what is the relationship
between dB and d′B? Since dB = {s | p∩q∩Fcw ⊆ s}, and d′B = {s | q∩ r∩Fcw ⊆ s},
we know that dB 6⊆ d′B, and d′B 6⊆ dB. Therefore, dB and d′B are incomparable, and in
fact, outside of dA none of the degrees in Dα are comparable with any in Dβ .
In P&R’s theory, then, it is possible to generate two scales with partial overlap
in degrees: dA is shared between Dα and Dβ , but all of the other degrees are
incomparable. There are thus several possible predictions for what should happen
when trying to make comparisons involving two distinct ordering sources, or two
prioritizations of the same ordering source. One possibility is that, in spite of any
potential overlap, non-identical modal scales count as fully distinct scales, so that
comparison across (prioritizations of) ordering sources should be as ill-formed as
other comparisons across different scales, such as (5):
(5) # Larry is more tired than Michael is clever. (Kennedy 1997: 27)
A second possibility is that 〈Dα ,≤α〉 and 〈Dβ ,≤β 〉 are parts of a single partially-
ordered scale 〈Dω ,≤ω〉, where Dω = {{s′ | s⊆ s′} | s⊆W}, and for all d,d′ ∈ Dω ,
d ≤ω d′ iff d ⊇ d′. In this case, it is possible for comparison across prioritizations to
be licit if the circumstances are right and the two degrees happen to be comparable.
If the two degrees are not comparable, one predicts either incommensurability
effects along the lines of (5), or simple falsehood, depending on one’s analysis of
incomparable degrees within the same scale.
As it turns out, the evidence points to neither of these predictions being accurate.
Consider the following variant of the CIA scenario from before. On Monday,
everything was as stated earlier: rescuing Pauline was ranked above rescuing Quinn,
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which was ranked above rescuing Rhonda. However, yesterday (Tuesday), the CIA
determined that now, rescuing Rhonda is top priority, followed by Quinn, then
Pauline. Once again, assume that nothing prevents Mary’s team from successfully
rescuing all three. We are therefore looking at a situation in which, on P&R’s theory,
the scales of importance on Monday and today are different: on Monday, the scale
is 〈Dα ,≤α〉, and today the scale is 〈Dβ ,≤β 〉.3 As demonstrated above, this means
that attempting to compare the relative importance of rescuing Quinn on Monday
and today should necessarily lead to deviance or falsehood, regardless of which of
the two aforementioned analyses is adopted. However, as an utterance to Mary from
her boss, (6) is perfectly well-formed, and potentially true:
(6) It is (currently) as important that you rescue Quinn as it was on Monday.
Comparisons across times are not the only problematic case. In English, impor-
tant can appear with a prepositional phrase to NP, which indicates whose priorities
are being considered. Thus, (7) is true iff rescuing Pauline is of sufficiently high
importance relative to the priorities of the CIA:
(7) It is important to the CIA that you rescue Pauline.
Putting aside how this is achieved compositionally, a simple analysis of (7) would be
that it sets the ordering source to gCIA, the set containing the CIA’s priorities. Since
the rankings of priorities can vary from individual to individual, on P&R’s theory
the presence of this prepositional phrase would presumably also set γ to γCIA, which
returns the CIA’s ranking of their priorities.
With this in mind, let’s say that both the CIA and the FBI want Pauline,
Quinn, and Rhonda rescued on Saturday, and that they desire nothing else. There-
fore, gCIA(w) = gFBI(w) = {p,q,r}. However, the CIA considers saving Pauline
to be top priority, followed by Quinn, followed by Rhonda, whereas the FBI
has these priorities reversed, with Rhonda ranking above Quinn, who is in turn
above Pauline. In other words, γCIA(gCIA(w)) = {{p,q,r},{p,q},{p}}, while
γFBI(gFBI(w)) = {{p,q,r},{q,r},{r}}. In this case, P&R predict that attempting to
compare the importance of saving Quinn to the FBI and to the CIA should lead to
deviance or falsehood, for the same reason as for the previous example. However,
once again, (8) would be a perfectly acceptable and possibly true statement when
said to Mary by her boss:
(8) For you to save Quinn is as important to the FBI as it is to the CIA.
3 Note that I ignore the fact that the set of viable worlds has presumably also changed from Monday to
today, since what is circumstantially possible changes over time. This makes things even worse for
P&R, since for them, changing the set of worlds under consideration also alters the scale. As we will
see in Section 3, the theory adopted in this paper faces no such problem.
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Note that (8) becomes no less felicitous if the CIA and FBI have wildly different
sets and rankings of priorities, or even priorities that contradict each other’s. As a
result, the overall picture that arises from examples like (6) and (8) is that the set of
modal degrees cannot be entirely parasitic on the choice and ranking of premises,
since comparisons can be made across quite different prioritizations.
2.4 Within-ordering theories and post hoc degree assignment
While I have only discussed P&R’s theory thus far, things look no better for other
conservative approaches. The theories of Kratzer (1991, 2012), Villalta (2008),
and Katz et al. (2012) all make modal comparisons based on the relative positions
of worlds within a given world-ordering. To concretize this idea a bit, I provide
Kratzer’s (1991) definition of better possibility in (9); the other theories mentioned
above operate on roughly the same principle.
(9) a. Given context c and world of evaluation w, p is at least as good a possibility
as q iff for all q-worlds w′ in Fcw, there exists some p-world w′′ in Fcw such
that w′′ 4gc(w) w′.
b. Given context c and world of evaluation w, p is a better possibility than q
iff p is at least as good a possibility as q, but not vice versa.
Presumably, p is more important than q would be analyzed in a similar fashion. But
it should be readily apparent that, since these theories based on the comparative
positions of worlds can only be defined relative to a given ordering of worlds, they
cannot adequately handle comparisons across two distinct world-orderings.
Nonetheless, there is a conceivable solution for all of these conservative theories
that warrants some discussion. At its heart, each of these approaches simply serves
as a way of ordering propositions by importance. With this in mind, one might
propose assigning each proposition in the domain of this propositional ordering
to some degree on the ontologically independent modal scale 〈D,≤〉, in a manner
that preserves this ordering. (That is, p is assigned a higher degree than q iff it is
more important than q.) Since this scale exists independently of any given ordering
source, each ordering source can map onto it, allowing for comparisons across
prioritizations.
Unfortunately, such a post hoc assignment of degrees will not work without
considerable further stipulation, as there is an infinite number of ways a given
ordering of propositions can be transferred onto a densely-ordered scale. In fact, if
the domains of the propositional orderings ≤ j and ≤k can be mapped to the scale
〈D,≤〉, then for any propositions p and q in the domain of ≤ j and ≤k, respectively,
there will always be mappings in which p is assigned a degree higher than—or
equal to, or less than—the one q is assigned to, while still maintaining the required
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relationship between each proposition-ordering and the scale. As a result, since the
path from premise set to scale is not properly anchored, the relationship between two
different mappings onto the same scale is arbitrary, rendering all but meaningless
any comparison across those two mappings.
That being said, the basic premise underlying this approach is an appealing one:
the problem of comparison across ordering sources can be resolved by properly
intertwining world-orderings and ontologically independent degrees. In the next
section, I offer a proposal for just how this intertwining between degrees and world-
orderings should take place.
3 The ordering source as degree-relative
In this section, I propose a means of fusing the Kratzerian tradition of modal
semantics with a degree-based semantics of gradability. Before delving into the
details of my proposal, however, some discussion of the general architecture of the
theory is in order.
3.1 The theory in broad strokes
In analyzing the asymmetric entailment from strong necessity modals like must to
weak necessity modals like should, von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) posit that there
are two ranked ordering sources, which I will call gc1 and g
c
2 (with g
c
1 outranking
gc2).
4 On this approach, must only utilizes the primary ordering source, universally
quantifying over the worlds in BEST(4gc1(w),F
c
w). Meanwhile, should only quantifies
over a subset of these worlds: namely, those in BEST(4gc2(w),BEST(4gc1(w),F
c
w)).
Since universal quantification over a subset is weaker than universal quantification
over a superset, must p entails should p. On a more intuitive level, must p can be
thought of as claiming that p holds in all acceptable worlds, while should p claims
that p holds in all ideal worlds, with the inclusion of the lower-ranked premises that
distinguish ideal from merely acceptable worlds serving to weaken the modal claim.
As noted above, P&R’s theory operates on what is fundamentally the same
principle: the more nitpicky one must be in order to require that p be the case, the
less important p is; the less demanding one needs to be to mandate p, the more
important p is. The theory articulated in this section also falls within this general
perspective, but with the added assumption that the modal scale 〈D,≤〉 is not derived
from the set and/or ranking of priorities, but leads an independent existence separate
from the contingencies of any given set or prioritization of premises. Since putting
4 In actuality, von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) allow for the existence of more than two ordering sources,
with a divide occuring between those that are primary and those that are secondary. For the purposes
of this paper, this distinction is irrelevant.
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degrees in the ontology is a common move in the semantics of gradability (see von
Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, Beck 2011 for discussion), I take extending this
approach to GMAs to be non-stipulative.
While degrees are separate ontological objects, each degree will be associated
with a set of ideal possible worlds, in a manner to be explained shortly. The means
of association between degrees and sets of worlds will be such that for any degrees
d1 and d2, where d1 < d2, the set of worlds associated with d1 is a subset of the
set of worlds associated with d2. This gradual removal of worlds on the way down
the scale corresponds to the aforementioned intuition that we are becoming more
and more demanding with respect to what constitutes an ideal world. This in turn
entails that universally quantifying over the worlds associated with d1 will be weaker
than universally quantifying over those associated with d2, so conversely, universal
quantification over associated worlds gets stronger going up the scale.
Following Kennedy (1997, 2007) in treating the denotation of an adjective as
a measure function, for a given proposition p, JimportantK will simply return the
highest degree such that p holds in all worlds associated with that degree. That is, if
ASSOCc(w,d) is the set of worlds associated with d in context c, given a world of
evaluation w, then important will have a denotation along the lines of (10):
(10) JimportantKc = λ pλw. max({d | ∀w′ ∈ ASSOCc(w,d)[p(w′)]})
3.2 Associating degrees and sets of worlds
The next step is to define how degrees are associated with shrinking sets of possible
worlds in the manner just described. A plausible starting place would be to add a
degree argument to the ordering source, making it a contextually determined function
from worlds and degrees to sets of propositions. The propositions in gc(w,d) (for
some d ∈ D) can then be thought of as propositions that would be d-important were
it not for potential conflicting premises and/or prohibitive circumstances, in much
the same way that for Kratzer (1981), the propositions in gc(w) are propositions that
would be necessary were it not for such possible conflicts.
Naturally, since gc(w,d) is a set of propositions, one can order worlds at a given
degree in the manner described in (3). However, this accomplishes little on its own.
There is no guarantee that BEST(4gc(w,d1),Fcw)will be a subset of BEST(4gc(w,d2),Fcw)
if d1 < d2, so this cannot be how degrees are associated with sets of worlds. In
other words, the set BEST(4gc(w,d1),Fcw) is not necessarily more demanding than
BEST(4gc(w,d2),Fcw) with regards to what constitutes an ideal set of worlds.
One way of fixing this is to follow the method articulated by von Fintel &
Iatridou (2008). Pretending for the time being that D consists only of the de-
grees d1, d2, and d3 (with d1 < d2 < d3), we can start by associating with d3
the set BEST(4gc(w,d3),Fcw). Next, the set of worlds associated with d2 would be
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BEST(4gc(w,d2),BEST(4gc(w,d3),Fcw)). Finally, the set of worlds associated with
d1 would be BEST(4gc(w,d1),BEST(4gc(w,d2),BEST(4gc(w,d3),Fcw))). This can be
thought of as a “best of the best” approach: going down the scale, a smaller and
smaller set of ideal worlds is being considered.
Another possibility is to claim that it is not sets of ideal worlds that trickle down
from higher degrees to lower degrees, but world-orderings. Katz et al. (2012) define
an operation ∗ that combines two sets of premises A1 and A2 into a single set of
premises, A1 ∗A2, which orders worlds as if A2 were serving as a tie-breaker for A1.
That is, if worlds w1 and w2 are strictly ordered or incomparable with respect to 4A1 ,
then w1 4A1∗A2 w2 iff w1 4A1 w2; but if w1 ≈A1 w2, then w1 4A1∗A2 w2 iff w1 4A2 w2.
As a result, it is guaranteed that BEST(4A1∗A2,Fcw) is a subset of BEST(4A1,Fcw).
With this in mind, let A= gc(w,d3), B= A∗gc(w,d2), and C = B∗gc(w,d1). We can
then associate with d3 the set of worlds BEST(4A,Fcw), with d2 the set BEST(4B,Fcw),
and with d1, BEST(4C,Fcw). Once again, we are left with a situation where the set
of worlds associated with a lower degree is a subset of the set of worlds associated
with a higher degree. This can be considered an approach of increasing discernment:
the set of worlds under consideration is the same at each degree level, but at lower
degrees, the ordering is more fine-grained.
Both of these aproaches capture in an intuitive manner the notion that on the
way down the scale, the list of demands that must be met for worlds to count as
ideal grows. But there’s a problem. In their current forms, both treatments require
that something, whether it be a set of ideal worlds or a world-ordering, be passed
from one degree to the next highest degree. However, given the common assumption
that scales are densely ordered, there is no such thing as a next highest degree.
Luckily, there is a way to avoid the need for a next highest degree under the approach
of increasing discernment: the world ordering 4+, defined in (11), simulates the
passing down of orderings from higher degrees to lower degrees in a way compatible
with a dense ordering of degrees.
(11) w1 4+gc,w,d w2 iff w1 ≺+gc,w,d w2 or w1 ≈+gc,w,d w2, where:
a. w1 ≺+gc,w,d w2 iff ∃d′ ≥ d[w1 ≺gc(w,d′) w2∧∀d′′ > d′[w1 4gc(w,d′′) w2]]
b. w1 ≈+gc,w,d w1 iff ∀d′ ≥ d[w1 ≈gc(w,d′) w2]
Graphics illustrating the definitions of ≈+ and ≺+ can be seen in Figure 1.
The important thing to note is that due to the definition of 4+, both strict ordering
(≺+) and incomparability of worlds are passed down from higher degrees to lower
degrees, while equivalence (≈+) is not. Note the similarity between this approach
and Katz et al.’s (2012): orderings at lower degrees can only serve as tie-breakers
for orderings at higher degrees.
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d4
d3
d2
d1
w1 ≈gc,w,d4 w2
w1 ≈gc,w,d3 w2
w1 6≈gc,w,d2 w2
w1 ≈+gc,w,d4 w2
w1 ≈+gc,w,d3 w2
w1 6≈+gc,w,d2 w2
w1 6≈+gc,w,d1 w2irrelevant
d4
d3
d2
d1
w1 4gc,w,d4 w2
w1 4gc,w,d3 w2
w1 ≺gc,w,d2 w2 w1 ≺+gc,w,d2 w2
w1 ≺+gc,w,d1 w2irrelevant
Figure 1 Graphics illustrating definitions of ≈+ (left) and ≺+ (right).
For example, let’s assume D has just two degrees, d1 and d2, with d1 < d2.
Furthermore, assume that gc(w,d2) = {p1, p2}, while gc(w,d1) = {q}, with p1, p2,
and q all being logically independent. It might be that we are going out to dinner,
and p1 is true in all worlds in which I wear a shirt to dinner, p2 is true in all worlds
in which I wear shoes to dinner, and q is true in all worlds in which I show up to
dinner on time. Thus, in the case of this example, wearing the right attire to dinner
is of higher priority than showing up on time.
Diagrams of 4+gc,w,d2 and 4
+
gc,w,d1
can be seen in Figure 2. In order to illustrate
4+ more easily, orderings are shown in terms of equivalence classes of worlds: each
proposition in each diagram is a set of worlds that are equivalent to each other in
the ordering at hand. Notice that the set of 4+gc,w,d1-ideal worlds (p1 ∩ p2 ∩ q) is
a proper subset of the set of 4+gc,w,d2-ideal worlds (p1∩ p2). In fact, for the same
reason that it is necessarily the case that BEST(4A1∗A2,Fcw)⊆ BEST(4A1,Fcw) in Katz
et al.’s (2012) formalism, by the definition of 4+ it will always be the case that
BEST(4+gc,w,d1,F
c
w) ⊆ BEST(4+gc,w,d2,Fcw) when d1 < d2. Thus, associating with d
the set of worlds BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw) leads to the desired result.
With this in mind, JimportantKc can now be defined following the template in
(10), but with one small change: instead of finding the maximum degree such that p
holds in all worlds associated with that degree, I will define important as returning
the supremum (least upper bound) of that set:
(12) JimportantKc = λ pλw. sup({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[p(w′)]})
The reason for this change is that it is possible, given the definition of 4+, for the
set {d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[p(w′)]} to lack a well-defined maximum, e.g. if it
is equal to {d | d < dα} for some degree dα .
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p1∩ p2
p1∩−p2 −p1∩ p2
−p1∩−p2
p1∩ p2∩q
p1∩ p2∩−q
p1∩−p2∩q
p1∩−p2∩−q
−p1∩ p2∩q
−p1∩ p2∩−q
−p1∩−p2∩q
−p1∩−p2∩−q
Figure 2 Diagrams of 4+gc,w,d2 (left) and 4
+
gc,w,d1
(right) from the toy example.
More ideal sets of worlds are toward the top.
3.3 Comparing across ordering sources
With the system now in place, let us once again look at (6). Since this example
involves modal evaluation at different times, an additional time argument must be
added to the ordering source and modal base. Let m be Monday and n now, and
as before, let p, q, and r be true in worlds in which Pauline, Quinn, and Rhonda,
respectively, are rescued on Saturday. In this case, the sentence in (6) will have the
denotation in (13).
(13) λw. sup({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,m,d,Fcw,m)[q(w′)]})≥
sup({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,n,d,Fcw,n)[q(w′)]})
Next, we supply the context from before and see if the truth conditions work
out. Let d1, d2, and d3 be degrees in D such that d1 < d2 < d3. On Monday,
Pauline is top priority, followed by Quinn, then Rhonda, so let gc(w,m,d3) = {p},
gc(w,m,d2) = {q}, and gc(w,m,d1) = {r}. The ranking today is reversed, so
gc(w,n,d3) = {r}, gc(w,n,d2) = {q}, and gc(w,n,d1) = {p}. For all degrees d 6∈
{d1,d2,d3}, gc(w,m,d) = gc(w,n,d) = /0. Note that while I have simply switched
the places of p and r in the transition from Monday to now, nothing in this theory
requires that this be the case. After all, if the CIA switches the rankings of Pauline
and Rhonda as before, but at the same time becomes much more laissez-faire, all
three propositions could become lower-priority than what they were before, thereby
rendering (6) false.
As stated in the scenario, Mary’s team is capable of saving all three hostages.
Therefore, p∩q∩ r∩Fcw,m 6= /0, and likewise for Fcw,n. (There is no need to stipulate
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Condition on d BEST(4+gc,w,m,d,Fcw,m) BEST(4
+
gc,w,n,d,F
c
w,n)
d > d3 Fcw,m F
c
w,n
d2 < d ≤ d3 p∩Fcw,m r∩Fcw,n
d1 < d ≤ d2 p∩q∩Fcw,m q∩ r∩Fcw,n
d ≤ d1 p∩q∩ r∩Fcw,m p∩q∩ r∩Fcw,n
Table 1 The sets of ideal worlds for all d ∈ D, on both Monday and today.
that Fcw,m = F
c
w,n. Given that the set of worlds that are circumstantially accessible
changes over time, this is a welcome consequence of the theory.)
With the context now in place, Table 1 illustrates, for all d ∈ D, what the sets
BEST(4+gc,w,m,d,Fcw,m) and BEST(4
+
gc,w,n,d,F
c
w,n) are. As can be seen in the table, on
Monday, the importance of rescuing Quinn on Saturday—and of any proposition
that is necessary with regards to rescuing Quinn, but not with regards to rescuing
Pauline—is d2, as this is the highest degree such that Quinn is rescued on Saturday in
all worlds associated with that degree. The same is true of today, modulo replacing
Pauline with Rhonda. As a result, (6) is predicted to be true in this scenario.
As for (15), the analysis is essentially the same, except that the difference
between the ordering sources is not the time variable, but the contextual parameter.
There is one ordering source, gFBI, which includes the FBI’s priorities, and another,
gCIA, with the CIA’s priorities. From there, the comparison takes place just as before.
3.4 An aside on incompatibles
P&R note that the version of their theory articulated in Section 2 runs into problems
with comparisons of incompatible propositions like (14):
(14) It is as important to preserve the wetlands as it is to build the new housing
(which would drain the wetlands). (Portner & Rubinstein 2014: 23)
Examples like this are problematic because if preserving the wetlands and building
the housing are incompatible, there can be no non-empty set of worlds such that both
occur in all members of that set. Hence, if important involves universal quantification
over sets of ideal worlds, then it seems that two incompatible propositions cannot be
equally important, contrary to (14).
P&R’s response is to abandon universal quantification over all ideal worlds,
replacing it with universal quantification over worlds at individual maxima (cf.
Kratzer’s (1991) definition of “good possibility”). Since a preorder of worlds can
have multiple maxima, it is thus possible for all worlds at one maximum to be worlds
in which the wetlands are preserved, with another maximum having only worlds
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where the housing is built. However, (14) can just as easily be formulated as a
comparison across different sets and/or rankings of priorities, just like (6) and (8).
That is, (14) can be thought of as essentially meaning the same thing as (15), which
includes priority-specifying in view of phrases à la Kratzer 1977:
(15) It is as important (in view of our environmental priorities) to preserve the
wetlands as it is (in view of our financial priorities) to build the new housing.
On this anlaysis, there are simply two ordering sources at play: genv, which
includes our environmental priorities, and gfin, which includes our financial priorities.
At a given degree d, it is possible for all worlds in BEST(4+genv,w,d,Fcw) to be worlds
in which the wetlands are preserved, and all worlds in BEST(4+
gfin,w,d
,Fcw) to be
worlds in which the housing is built, even if there are no worlds in Fcw in which both
take place.
In the analysis adopted in this paper, (14) can thus be treated in a fashion that
retains the view of important as involving universal quantification over the set of
all ideal worlds. As will be shown in Section 4, such an analysis has benefits not
only in terms of intuitive plausibility, but also with respect to capturing entailment
relations that are attributable to the dual relationship between universal and existential
quantification.
4 Existential quantification and cross-polarity
Next, I extend this analysis from universally-quantifying GMAs like important to
existentially-quantifying GMAs like permissible. Of particular importance to this
extension will be the fact that (16a) and (16b) are mutually entailing:
(16) a. It is more important that you do the dishes than it is that you walk the dog.
b. It is more permissible for you to not walk the dog than it is for you to not
do the dishes.
The mutual entailment in (16), represented in a template form in (17), bears a
prima facie resemblance to inferences involving antonymous adjectives like tall/short
and dirty/clean, as in (18):
(17) p is more important than q iff −q is more permissible than −p.
(18) a. x is taller than y iff y is shorter than x.
b. x is dirtier than y iff y is cleaner than x.
These parallels are further bolstered by the fact that comparing the importance of p
with the permissibility of q (or −q), much like comparing the tallness (or dirtiness)
of x with the shortness (or cleanness) of y, leads to deviance:
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(19) a. # It is more important that you do the dishes than it is permissible for you
to not walk the dog.5
b. # Sandra is taller than Ann is short.
c. # The floor is dirtier than the windows are clean.
Thus, by all appearances, important and permissible are opposite-polarity adjectives
like tall/short and dirty/clean, but with the additional caveat that the inference in
(17) requires the inclusion of negation where the inferences in (18) do not.
I will treat both of these facts as resulting from the dual nature of universal
and existential quantification. The analysis of important in this paper has relied on
the plausible assertion that the more demanding one has to be in order to mandate
p, the less important p is. But there is another, related assertion that is equally
plausible: the more demanding one has to be in order to forbid p (or, equivalently,
the more demanding that one can be while still allowing p), the more permissible p
is. This intuition is easy to carry over to the apparatus developed so far. Because
BEST(4+gc,w,d1,F
c
w) ⊆ BEST(4+gc,w,d2 ,Fcw) if d1 < d2, not only does universal quan-
tification get weaker at lower degrees, but existential quantification gets stronger.
Therefore, in accordance with our intuition, we can claim in informal terms that p is
more permissible than q iff the distance we can go down the scale while retaining
ideal worlds in which p holds is greater than the distance we can go down the scale
while retaining ideal worlds in which q holds.
On such an analysis, (17) falls out immediately. Because universal and existential
quantification are duals, the sets {d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[p(w′)]} and {d | ∃w′ ∈
BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[¬p(w′)]}will always serve to partition the set D of modal degrees,
with the former constituting some bottom portion of the scale, and the latter being
the top portion. Thus, if the degrees at which p holds in all ideal worlds extend
farther upward than the degrees at which q holds in all ideal worlds (i.e., p is more
important than q), then the degrees at which −q holds in some ideal world extend
farther downward than the degrees at which −p holds in some ideal world (i.e., −q
is more permissible than −p).
The next step is to actually implement this intuition. I follow Kennedy (1997,
2001) in analyzing cross-polarity by switching from individual degrees to extents.
5 One might claim that this deviance is due to the fact that the complement of important is a that
clause, while the complement of permissible is a for. . . to clause. However, as (i) shows, important
comparatives with one that clause and one for. . . to clause are well-formed. Furthermore, (ii), which
only makes use of for . . . to clauses, is as bad as (19a).
(i) It is more important for you to do the dishes than it is that you walk the dog.
(ii) # It is more important for you to do the dishes than it is permissible for you to not walk the
dog.
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Extents are sets of degrees with two important properties. First, they are convex:
if an extent ε is such that d1,d3 ∈ ε , and d1 < d2 < d3, then d2 ∈ ε . Second, they
are topologically closed: an extent must contain all of its limit points, so that
{d | d ≤ dα} is an extent, while {d | d < dα} is not.6 Extents are ordered by ≤e,
where ε1 ≤e ε2 iff ε1 ⊆ ε2.
For our purposes, two types of extents are worth noting: upward extends, which
go upward from the bottom of the scale, and downward extents, going from the top
of the scale downward. Since going up the scale strengthens universal quantification,
while going down the scale strengthens existential quantification, the definition of
important in (20) below will always return an upward extent, and that of permissible
a downward extent:
(20) If cl(δ ) is the closure (the smallest closed superset) of δ , then
a. JimportantKc = λ pλw. cl({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[p(w′)]})
b. JpermissibleKc = λ pλw. cl({d | ∃w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[p(w′)]})
Given the definitions in (20), if pdishes is true in worlds in which you do the
dishes, and pdog is true in worlds in which you walk the dog, the denotations of (16a)
and (16b) are (21a) and (21b), respectively:
(21) a. λw. cl({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[pdishes(w′)]})>e
cl({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[pdog(w′)]})
b. λw. cl({d | ∃w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[¬pdog(w′)]})>e
cl({d | ∃w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc,w,d,Fcw)[¬pdishes(w′)]})
I leave it to the reader to prove to his or her own satisfaction that (21a) and (21b) are
equivalent, as desired.
This analysis also explains the ill-formedness of (19a). For Kennedy (1997,
2001), the deviance of (19b-c) is due to the fact that the extents ε1 and ε2 are only
comparable by ≤e if ε1 ⊆ ε2 or ε2 ⊆ ε1, so upward extents and downward extents,
which do not stand in the subset relation to each other, will be incomparable. The
same reasoning applies here: since the importance of a proposition is an upward
extent, and the permissibility of a proposition is a downward extent, comparing the
importance of one proposition with the permissibility of another will be ill-formed.
6 Of course, this presupposes that a topology on D has been defined. I assume a topology on D that is
homeomorphic to the normal topology on some convex subset of the real or rational numbers. In
addition, note that topological closure is distinct from the notion of closure as discussed in work on
scale structure (see, e.g., Kennedy & McNally 1999, 2005; Rotstein & Winter 2004), since a set can
extend infinitely downward, infinitely upward, or even both, while still containing all its limit points.
Finally, Kennedy (2001) states that extents must be non-empty; here I remain agnostic.
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5 Positive form and entailments with auxiliaries
Finally, let us look at the entailments discussed in the introduction, where we saw that
must p asymmetrically entails it is important that p, which in turn asymmetrically
entails should p. In analyzing these entailments, I will adopt von Fintel & Iatridou’s
(2008) previously discussed theory of weak versus strong necessity modals. Recall
that von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) posit the existence of two ranked ordering sources,
gc1 and g
c
2, with must quantifying over BEST(4gc1(w),F
c
w), the set of ideal worlds with
respect to 4gc1(w). In the case of should, these ideal worlds are then passed down to
4gc2(w), resulting in quantification over BEST(4gc2(w),BEST(4gc1(w),F
c
w)). Since the
latter set is a subset of the former, universal quantification over the latter is weaker
than universal quantification over the former, so the right entailments are derived.
In extending this account to the degree-relative approach discussed in the previ-
ous two sections, I will limit the inclusion of degrees to gc2, so that g
c
1 will operate
in a straightforwardly Kratzerian manner. In other words, degrees will be involved
in the denotations of important and should, but not in the denotation of must. This
exclusion of degrees from gc1 is done out of a desire for brevity and technical sim-
plicity; I leave it to future work to determine whether degrees should actually be
included there as well.
With this in mind, we can treat must exactly like von Fintel & Iatridou (2008)
do, defining it as universal quantification over worlds in BEST(4gc1(w),F
c
w), which I
abbreviate as DOMc(w) for ease of reading.
(22) JmustKc = λ pλw. ∀w′ ∈ DOMc(w)[p(w′)]
Turning now to important, in order to allow for the existence of multiple ordering
sources, we must again update our definition by tweaking the one in (20a), replacing
Fcw with DOM
c(w). This way, only worlds that are ideal with respect to 4gc1(w) are
under consideration:
(23) JimportantKc = λ pλw. cl({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc2,w,d,DOMc(w))[p(w′)]})
Finally, we are left with should. Presumably, should ought to have the same
semantic type as must, rather than important: after taking a proposition and a world
of evaluation, it returns a truth value, rather than a degree. With this in mind, I
propose the definition of should in (24), which posits that should p is true iff p has
at least some importance.
(24) JshouldKc = λ pλw. {d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc2,w,d,DOMc(w))[p(w′)]} 6= /0
Before discussing how these definitions adequately capture the entailments
between must p, it is important that p, and should p, it is necessary to address how
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the positive use of gradable adjectives (e.g., John is tall, in contrast to John is taller
than Bill) is handled within a theory in which the denotations of gradable adjectives
are measure functions. Kennedy (1997, 2007), who adopts such a theory, follows von
Stechow (1984) in positing the presence of an unpronounced morpheme POS, which
combines with the adjective to make an implicit comparative that returns true iff the
extent returned by the measure function is no less than some contextually determined
standard extent. If εs is this standard extent, the denotation of POS important will be
as seen in (25):
(25) JPOS importantKc =
λ pλw. cl({d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc2,w,d,DOM
c(w))[p(w′)]})≥e εs
Assuming that the pronoun it in it is POS important that p is semantically idle, the
denotation of it is POS important that p will be the denotation in (25) applied to p.
From these definitions, the entailment from must p to it is POS important that p
comes without stipulation. If Jmust pKc is true in world w, then p holds in all worlds
in DOMc(w). Since for any given degree d, BEST(4+gc,w,d,DOMc(w))⊆ DOMc(w), p
will also hold at all worlds associated with each degree, so that JimportantKc(p)(w)=
D, the set of all modal degrees. No matter what εs is, D ≥e εs because D ⊇ εs, soJPOS importantKc(p)(w) is guaranteed to be true.
Furthermore, if εs 6= /0 (an assumption that can be taken for granted, or else
every proposition would be vacuously important), the entailment from it is POS
important that p to should p follows as well. Using δ as shorthand for the set
{d | ∀w′ ∈ BEST(4+gc2,w,d,DOM
c(w))[p(w′)]}, the former asserts that cl(δ ) ≥e εs,
which, by the definition of≥e, is equivalent to cl(δ )⊇ εs. Since εs 6= /0, we know that
it is also the case that cl(δ ) 6= /0. In addition, note that the empty set is topologically
closed, since it vacuously contains all its limit points. Thus, cl( /0) = /0, so if cl(δ ) 6= /0,
then δ 6= /0, which is exactly what should p asserts.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that previous conservative theories of gradable modality
cannot properly handle cases of comparison across ordering sources. I resolved
this problem by including modal degrees in the ontology, while still retaining the
premise-based world ordering and quantification that lies at the heart of conservative
theories. I then extended this theory to account for existentially-quantifying GMAs,
as well as inferences between GMAs and modal auxiliaries. The result was a
theory that remained faithful to traditional approaches to the semantics of modality,
but without stipulating a fundamental difference between modal and non-modal
gradability.
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